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ACTS OF DIAGNOSIS BY NURSES
AND THE COLORADO
PROFESSIONAL NURSING PRACTICE ACT
"The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept."
-William Shakespeare*

p

INTRODUCTION

ATIENTS returning from cardiac surgery in Denver's Saint Luke's
Hospital are placed in a coronary intensive care unit. Also
placed in the unit are patients with serious rhythm disturbances.
Saint Luke's Hospital has claimed that the intensive care unit will
reduce the mortality from heart failure threatening these patients
by 50 percent.1 The success of the unit owes much to the skill of
the specially trained nurses who monitor the heartbeat of each patient, often without a doctor's supervision. The unit will undoubtedly
continue to be a valuable addition to Colorado's medical services,
until a nurse in the unit is convicted of violating the Colorado Professional Nursing Practice Act:.2 The charge would be that the nurse
made an act of diagnosis.
The Nursing Practice Act states that the "practice of professional nursing.. . shall not be deemed to include acts of diagnosis
or prescription of therapeutic or corrective measures."3 The question to be discussed in this Note is the meaning of "acts of diagnosis."
To provide a factual focus, the authors interviewed and observed
nurses in the city of Denver who have been given broad medical
responsibility. In addition, documents were received from Saint
Luke's Hospital outlining the duties of nurses in intensive care units.
The written standing orders of Saint Luke's intensive care unit
will be used as a factual point of reference for the discussion of
diagnosis. It is important to note that doctors have not been stationed in the unit on a full time basis. The unit is so designed that
the nurse on duty will continuously monitor the heartbeat and general condition of the patient. If the nurse judges that the patient
is having a cardiac arrest she will initiate resuscitative measures.
If there is an arrest, the nurse is not to wait for a doctor's directions.
*MEASURE FOR MEASURE, Act II, Scene 2.

1Intensive Care Unit Committee & Heart Station Committee, Operational Policies
Concerning Coronary Intensive Care Unit (memo received from Dr. Robert Liggett,
Medical Director of Education, Saint Luke's Hospital, Denver, Colorado, October 11,
1967) (hereinafter cited as Operational Policies].
2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 97-1-1 to -29 (1963).
31d. § 97-1-2(1)(1963).
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The nurses in the intensive care unit of Saint Luke's Hospital
have the following standing orders:
Emergency: Respond promptly to alarm by going to bedside.
Check pulse (carotid or femoral) as well as cardioscope.
Be sure you aren't dealing with a false alarm.

Patient in true arrest (asystole or ventricular fibrillation) will be unconscious.
If true emergency:
Call for help

Start ventilating patient
Start External cardiac compression

If Ventricular Fibrillationuse defibrillator if no physi-

cian is present.
If Cardiac Standstill give icc 1:1000 Epinephrin intravenously (in the tube of the running I.V. solution)

continuing
external cardiac compression and ventillation. 4
Viewed in one light, the question of whether nurses in the intensive care unit may be violating the statutory prohibition of diagnosis is academic. None of the doctors or nurses interviewed were
aware of any prosecution of a nurse for diagnosing. However, interviews did reveal an uncertainty about the meaning of the law. Uneasiness arose when a nursing procedure which appeared to be medically proper was analyzed in light of the statute. Several doctors
complained that this uncertainty hobbled the planning of new medical programs designed to relieve overburdened doctors by giving
more responsibility to nurses. Therefore, an inquiry into the meaning of diagnosis is far from academic if uncertainty about the diagnosis prohibition is retarding new medical programs for the citizens
of Colorado.
I. STATUTORY REGULATION

OF WHAT A NURSE CAN

Do

Colorado is not the only state which prohibits nurses from
making acts of diagnosis; nineteen other states have similar provisions.5 Furthermore, the prohibition of diagnosis is not an archaic
4 Operational Policies 2.
5
8
4
ALA. CODE tit. 46, § 1 9(3 ) (Supp. 1965);
ALASKA STAT. § 08.68.410(5) (1962);
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 32-1601(5)(d) (Supp. 1967);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1902 (Supp. 1966);

§ 67-2(b)(Supp. 1965) ;
§ 54-1413(e) (Supp. 1967);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 35.35(1) (Smith-Hurd 1966);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-1113(b) (1)(1964) ;
ME, REV, STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 2102(2) (D) (1964)
1MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 66-1222 (1) (Supp. 1967);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 632.010(5)(1957);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 326-A:2(I)(1966);
HAWAII REV. LAWS
IDAHO CODE ANN.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-158(3) (a) (Supp

1967);
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statutory provision; all of the states having the provision enacted
them after 1947. The prohibition is usually added as a caveat to
the statutory definition of the practice of professional nursing.
Most states have a definition of the practice of professional
nursing similar to the Colorado provision, which reads:
The "practice of professional nursing" shall mean the perform-

ance for compensation of any act in the observation or care of the
ill, injured, or infirm or in the maintenance of health or preservation of illness of others or in the supervision and teaching of other
personnel or the administration of medicines and treatments as
prescribed by a person licensed to practice medicine or dentistry
in this state, requiring substantial specialized judgment and skill
and based on knowledge am! applicaticn of the principles of
biological, physical and social sciences.,,

The Colorado statute then adds:
The foregoing shall not be deemed to include acts7 of diagnosis

or prescription of therapeutic or corrective measures.
The question of whether the acts of nurses in the coronary intensive care units constitute acts of diagnosis could be answered if
there were a judicial construction of the prohibition by the Colorado
Supreme Court. However, the Colorado court has not been called
upon to explain the statute's prohibition. The courts of the 19 other
states prohibiting diagnosis are also silent.
II.

THE VARIED MEANINGS OF DIAGNOSIS

Attempts to understand the prohibition are not completely
frustrated because the word "diagnosis" as it appears in other Colorado statutes has been defined both by statute and judicial construction. Colorado chiropodists are allowed to diagnose ailments of
the human toe, foot, and leg 8 and the statute allowing diagnosis
says, "Diagnosis shall be held to mean ascertaining a disease or
ailment by its symptoms.'' °
In Hurley v. People' ° the Colorado Supreme Court held that a
man who was conducting a school for healing was not guilty of the
unauthorized practice of medicine. Although he discussed disease
in general terms, he made no examination of the ailments of any
N.D.CENT.

CODE § 43-12-01(2)(Supp. 1967);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 678.015(1967);
S.D. CODE § 27.0902(2) (Supp. 1960);
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 58-31-4(5)(Supp. 1967);
VT. STAT. ANN.tit.
26, § 1552(2) (B) (1967)
WASH. REV.CODE ANN.§ 18.88.030(1961).

6

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 97-1-2(1)(1963).

7Id.
8Id.

§

91-2-2.

9Id. § 91-2-2(2) (c).
1099 Colo. 510, 63 P.2d 1227 (1936).
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individual. The court said, "Clearly, as we conceive, the first and
primary concern of the medical practitioner is to ascertain what
afflicts his ailing patient- to make diagnosis; he then determines
what will remedy the ills of the sufferer, which he proceeds to
administer.""
If the Colorado statutory and judicial definition of diagnosis
is used-that it is the ascertaining of a disease or ailment by its
symptoms - then a strong argument can be made that nurses in the
intensive care unit are not diagnosing. Under the statute, diagnosis
would be the determination of the disease based upon an evaluation
of symptoms. Diagnosis would be the selection of one disease from
a possibility of diseases suggested by the symptoms. On the other
hand, diagnosis would not be a judgment of whether a symptom
is present or a judgment of the seriousness of the symptom. When
the nurse judges that the patient exhibits ventricular fibrillation she
is merely observing a symptom, not diagnosing the disease suggested.
In determining that the patient is suffering a true cardiac arrest she
is exercising judgment as to the seriousness of the symptom, but
she is not ascertaining the nature of the disease.
It also can be argued that the diagnosis of the patient has already been made when the doctor assigns the patient to the intensive care unit. The doctor has determined that the patient is suffering from a particular heart disease and that the medication called
for in the nurse's standing order is always appropriate to ease the
symptoms the patient is likely to exhibit. The nurse's responsibility
is not to determine the particular disease nor is she called upon to
decide what medication will ease the symptoms. Her responsibility
is to judge the gravity of the symptom and to act under the direction of her standing orders.
However, this argument in favor of the legality of nursing
duties in the intensive care unit seems to be rebutted by a 1963 letter
from the Colorado Attorney General to the Colorado State Board
of Nursing:
In reply to your inquiry as to whether professional nurses
may legally make a tentative diagnosis and then use a standing
order signed by a doctor in the treatment of the particular condition involved, I wish to advise that acts of diagnosis are expressly
excluded from the definition of the practice of professional nursing
as set forth in C.R.S. '53 (1960 Perm. Supp.), 97-2-2(1). As
we construe this section, a professional nurse is not authorized under
the law, as part of the practice of professional nursing, to make a
diagnosis.
Diagnosis is recognition of a disease from its symptoms. [case
cited from California] "Diagnosis means a summary of symptoms

with the conclusions arrived at therefrom; determination of the
11Id. at 516, 63 P.2d at 1229.
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distinctive nature of disease." [Minnesota case cited] A nurse is
not permitted to make a diagnosis, tentative or otherwise.
In answer to your second question as to whether a nurse
following this procedure would be practicing medicine, C.R.S.
1953, 91-1-6(1)(a), includes "diagnosis" in the term "practice
of medicine." It would appear, therefore, that a nurse who made
a tentative2 diagnosis of a certain condition would be practicing
medicine.'
Unfortunately, the letter provides no factual focus whereby

one could distinguish between a nurse's judgment of symptoms and
the act of making "a tentative diagnosis of a certain condition."
The effect of the letter is not to clarify the distinction between
proper nursing judgments and acts of diagnosis but to warn nurses
that if they fail to make the right distinction they are subject to the
charge of practicing medicine.'"
A review of decisions by other state courts reveals two different interpretations of the term diagnosis. Like the Colorado Supreme
Court, other courts have had no difficulty in arriving at a definition
of diagnosis. Almost all courts would agree that diagnosis is the
determination of a disease from its symptoms. Confusion arises
when the court applies the definition to the fact situation. According to the rationale of some courts, diagnosis only takes place when
the nurse attempts to determine the particular disease. The nurse
is properly allowed the responsibility of judging the gravity of
symptoms without engaging in diagnosis. In opposition to this view
are cases which hold that when a nurse evaluates a symptom and
judges that no serious disease is indicated, she is making an act of
diagnosis.
The rationale of the first case cited in the Attorney General's
letter would seem to give the nurse wide discretion in judging symptoms. In Maranville v. State Board of Equalization4 the court commented that a lay technician who made x-ray pictures and analyzed
their meaning in reports to doctors and dentists was not making
acts of diagnosis. The court said, "He made no diagnoses from the
radiographs. But he did advise the professional men of his conclusions of conditions of anatomies as they appeared to him in the
pictures. He 'interpreted light shadows.' "'5 Although one would
like to know more facts about the "conclusions of conditions of
anatomies," the court in this case allowed the technician wide dis12 Letter from Duke W. Dunbar, Colorado Attorney General,
Dickinson, R.N., Director of Nursing Education and Licensing,
of Nursing, Aug. 19, 1963.
13 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-1-6(1963) defines the practice
which include the word diagnose. Section 91-1-29 makes the
of medicine a misdemeanor.
1499

15

222

Cal. App. 2d 841, 222 P.2d 898 (1950).
P.2d at 898.

to Mrs. Madolin M.
Colorado State Board

of medicine in terms
unauthorized practice

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 45

cretion in evaluating conditions without judging him guilty of diagnosing. It would seem that this court would allow a nurse similar
discretion in evaluating symptoms as long as she does not attempt
to determine the disease suggested by the symptoms.
Contrary to the reasoning of this case is People v. Willis1" in
which an unlicensed chiropractor was convicted of treating the sick
without being licensed by the state. The chiropractor defended on
the ground that the chiropractic science does not recognize disease
and hence no chiropractor could make a diagnosis. The California
court rejected this argument by saying:
Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any one trying to restore
to a normal condition a person who is abnormal without a prior
investigation and determination, in a general way at least, of the
character of the abnormality. Manifestly, there are no fixed limits
to a diagnosis. It may not amount to a scientific classification of
the ailment, but it may go no further than an observation of the
most obstrusive symptoms, and may be accurate or inaccurate, and

yet be within the contemplation of the statute. It seems like an
unjust aspersion on the character and intelligence of this respectable
body of practitioners to intimate that they attempt to restore "the

normal activity of the tissues" without any inquiry or investigation
as to what tissues are affected and in what manner their activity may
be abnormal.' 7

This case indicates the problem of using the word "diagnose"
in a variety of statutes designed to correct different abuses. Thus,
courts may be tempted to adopt a broad definition of the word in
a statute such as the Colorado statute which prohibits an unlicensed
person to hold himself out "as being able to diagnose, treat, prescribe for, palliate or prevent any human disease .... .s On the
other hand, public policy may be better served by a strict definition
of the word diagnosis in the Professional Nursing Practice Act.
Another example of a broad judicial definition of diagnosis is
contained in Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co. 9 A nurse employed by the company treated a puncture wound in an employee's
forehead caused by another employee who let a piece of metal slip
from his hand. The nurse swabbed the wound with an antiseptic
and put a bandage on it. The employee saw the nurse the next two
days and she applied more medication but did not probe the wound.
The nurse worked under standing orders signed by a doctor
who would accept patients injured beyond the scope of the nurse's
practice. The employees had to see the nurse first and could only
see the doctor upon the nurse's authorization. According to her
testimony, it was her duty to refer any condition or injury she was
1662 Cal. App. 717, 217 P. 771 (1923).
17217 P. at 772.
8

' CoLo. REv.STAT. ANN.§ 91-1-6(1) (b)(1963).
19

136 Cal. App. 2d 229, 288 P.2d 581 (1955).
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not familiar with, or not sure about, to the doctor for diagnosis.
The employee's wound healed except for a small red mark.
After two or three months the redness began to spread and started
to become puffy. However, the nurse waited 10 months before
referring the employee to the doctor. The injury was then diagnosed as skin cancer and skin grafts were required to cure it.
The court affirmed a judgment that the nurse was negligent
and said that evidence was sufficient to show that the nurse did not
properly probe the wound for foreign matter, and that she unreasonably delayed in referring the employee to the doctor, despite indications that the wound was not properly healing.
The court then concluded that a nurse in evaluating the seriousness of a symptom is making an act of diagnosis:
A nurse in order to administer first aid properly and effectively
must make a sufficient diagnosis to enable her to apply the appropriate remedy. Usually she receives some history of the accident
or illness from the patient, inspects a wound, and bases her choice
of treatment on the deductions thus made. She has been trained,
but to a lesser degree than a physician, in the recognition of the
symptoms of diseases and injuries. She should be able to diagnose,
according to appellant nurse's own testimony herein, sufficiently to
know whether it is a condition within her authority to treat as a
first aid case or whether it bears danger signs that should warn
her to send the patient to a physician. 20
The reasoning of the Cooper case is persuasive because the
nurse, in judging the gravity of symptoms, must base her judgment
upon the seriousness of the possible diseases suggested by the symptoms. Her analysis of the patient's complaint duplicates in a less
sophisticated degree the analysis of the doctor. Of course, the nurse's
treatment of the patient differs from the doctor's in that she cannot
prescribe the medicines that the doctor can. In looking at the facts
of the Cooper case, one can ask whether the diagnosis dividing line
can be drawn at the point where the nurse treats the patient. Did
the nurse diagnose when she applied the antiseptic? The answer
should be no, because the one important action by the nurse was
her decision that no doctor was needed. Even if she had applied no
medication, her decision that a doctor was not needed would be the
factor that determined the patient's future medical care. Thus, a
nurse may be guilty of making an act of diagnosis when she decides
that no serious disease or symptom is indicated. Or, the nurse in
the intensive care unit may be making a diagnosis when she determines that there is no false alarm and that the standing order should
be executed. It is this decision that duplicates the decision a doctor
would make in a similar situation.
20288 P.2d at 587.
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The uncertainty surrounding diagnosis is recognized by professional nursing associations and authorities in this field of medical care. 2 Their approach to the problem is keyed to the actual
day-to-day practice of nursing, which recognizes the fact that nurses
must observe symptoms and conditions and act on their observations.
They define diagnosis as the utilization of intelligence to interpret
known facts, and acting upon the decision reached from this interpretation. The differentiation of a "doctor's diagnosis" and a "nursing
diagnosis" is based on the courses of action open to each profession
after the decision from the observation is made. Nurses cannot prescribe therapeutic measures or positive treatment; this is the sole
function of the doctor. However, the nurse can act to avoid further
complication or aggravation of the patient's condition based on her
observation of the symptoms present. It should be noted here that
most of these authorities believe the emergency exception to the
diagnosis prohibition allows the nurse to do all she deems necessary
and proper, including that which is normally only action allowed
a doctor.
The observation by the authors of nursing practices in Denver
revealed that the above "professional" definition of diagnosis was
the standard used between doctors and nurses. But, to reiterate, the
actual practice of nursing under this definition does not correspond
to the law of the State of Colorado.
Ironically, an admission that nurses make some type of diagnosis was also made in a paper entitled Saint Luke's Hospital Legal Aspects of Coronary Care." The paper approvingly quoted
a 1965 statement by the Cardiac Nurse Consultant of the Colorado
Department of Public Health:
1. It would appear that defibrillation may fall in the same category
as closed chest cardiac massage inasmuch as they both involve a
potential diagnosis. However, in an emergency a nurse may be
expected to make a diagnosis. Furthermore, if the medical staff
of any institution gives written consent and it is accepted as part
of the hospital routine, I would feel that the nurse is protected.
2. With the latest monitoring equipment and with proper teaching,
a nurse can identify on the cardioscope the particular pattern
which indicates ventricular fibrillation.
3. Experimentation being carried out today in specified intensive
units for coronary care indicate that immediate application of
emergency procedures, when necessary, has resulted
in reversing
2
the pattern of death from ventricular fibrillation. 3
& B. ANDERSON, NURSING PRACTICE AND THE LAW, 265-66 (2d ed.
1962).
22 Compiled by Marianne Boettner, R.N., Dec. 20, 1965, from a lecture by Audrey
Jones, R.N., Dec. 16, 1965 (received from Dr. Robert Liggett, Medical Director of
Education, Saint Luke's Hospital, Denver, Colorado).

21 M. LESNIK

23

Id. at 2.
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The admission that the intensive care nurse will make a "potential diagnosis" is not the only point of interest in the statement;
the defense of nursing conduct is hinged on the emergency exception.
The major problem with this defense is that the statutory prohibition against the unlicensed practice of medicine limits the emergency
exception to the "gratuitous rendering of services in cases of emergency."24 Since the intensive care ward nurse is a salaried employee
of the hospital, the probability of convincing a court to apply the
exception to her is almost nil. The inescapable conclusion is that
this defense is not available in this situation.
Furthermore, the treatment of a patient in the intensive care
unit is at best a planned emergency because the only unforeseen
element is the time of the cardiac arrest. The person to be stricken
by the emergency, the place of the emergency, and the nature of the
emergency have all been anticipated and prepared for. The plan
of the intensive care unit is that when the patient is stricken a nurse
will initiate resuscitative measures. It is anticipated that no doctor
will be in the unit to make the initial decisions.
The final question about the intensive care unit is the legality
of standing orders. As the authors of Nursing Practice and the Law
indicate in the following passage, the problem is based upon an
interpretation of the meaning of diagnosis:
Great confusion prevails as to the validity of standing orders.
In effect, standing orders presume to constitute medical direction
for the execution of medical acts in the physician's absence. To the
extent that they constitute instructions for cases already diagnosed,
such orders are valid. Although no specific statute or judicial
decision may be cited, it would appear that such standing orders
should be signed by the attending physician.
To the extent that standing orders provide positive measures
for cases to be diagnosed, such orders are invalid. A physician may
not delegate the authority to diagnose, to treat or to prescribe. A
standing order for treatment of a headache or a cold is illegal,
25
since it presupposes a prescription based upon a diagnosis.

It appears that there are three uncertainties about the legality
of intensive care units in Colorado: whether the nurse is making a
diagnosis, whether the emergency exception applies, and whether
standing orders are legal. The Colorado authorities and the judicial
authorities of other states give no reassuring answer to ease these
uncertainties.
III.

OBSERVATION OF DECISIONS MADE BY DENVER NURSES

One can hope that questions about the legality of intensive care
units are academic. However, the observations by the authors of
2

4 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9i-1-6(3) (b) (1963).

2 N. LESNIK & B. ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 281.
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this Note revealed that the same charge of making acts of diagnosis
could be leveled against the activities of other nurses in Denver.
Time was spent with two nurses from the Visiting Nurse Service of the City of Denver. Nurses in this organization visit families
and individuals who have medical problems yet who cannot afford
private physicians. One such visit illustrates the acts the nurse performs and the decisions she makes.
The Visiting Nurse called on a family that had recently migrated to Denver from a neighboring state. The mother and her
three children were at home; the father was at work. The children
were all under the age of six and the mother was expecting another
child in two months. The mother complained about the poor heating in the house and said that the house temperature went rather
low at night. Because of the cold, the family slept and played in
the living room. The children had colds the week before but one
was feeling much better. One child who had been sleeping on the
couch woke up during the visit and complained of a sore throat.
After some coaxing the nurse was able to get the child to open her
mouth and let the nurse make an examination. The nurse said there
was an inflammation but it did not look too serious. The nurse
then counseled the mother on the need to keep shoes and clothes
on the children and the need to take them to the neighborhood
health center for inoculations. The nurse also said that the mother
herself should be examined by a doctor. The mother admitted that
it might be good for the children to get their shots, but she did not
want to be lectured by a doctor. However, she said she would take
the children to the health center even though she herself hated
pregnancy examinations.
The nurse in this visit evaluated the health of the children and
determined that none were seriously ill. Unfortunately, a doctor
will not review her decision because the mother's fear of a doctor's
lectures will probably overcome her good intentions.
Later that day, the Visiting Nurse went ahead and made an
appointment for the mother at the neighborhood health center.
Observation of activities at this center revealed that some nurses
who have received special instruction in pediatrics give children
physical examinations. The nurse, free from the supervision of a
doctor, evaluates among other things the condition of the child's
heartbeat, reflexes, eyes, ears and throat. A history of the health
of the child is taken from the mother. Based on these indications
the nurse evaluates the health of the child. She may judge that the
child's health is satisfactory. She may judge that the child has a
health problem but that the immediate attention of a doctor is not
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needed. Finally, she may judge that the child is seriously ill and
that immediate medical attention is necessary.
Observations of the work of the Pediatric Nurse and the Visiting Nurse demonstrate that the nurse must contemplate the possible
diseases indicated by the symptoms she observes. This is the basis
of her decision that the child is in good or poor health. However,
she does not attempt to ascertain a particular disease and hence her
actions would not come within a strict interpretation of the wording
of the Colorado statutory definition of diagnosis -ascertaining
a
disease or ailment by its symptoms.
The most important aspect of the nurse's activity is her evaluation of the person's condition. That conclusion temporarily determines whether there will or will not be future medical treatment.
However, this activity does not distinguish the Pediatric or Visiting
Nurse from other nurses with more traditional responsibilities. The
nurse on the hospital floor who thinks that a patient's complaints
do not merit a doctor's attention is making a similar evaluation or,
perhaps, diagnosis.
IV.

THE NURSE'S STANDARD OF CARE

The Colorado nurse's legal problems are complicated further
by the civil liability imposed upon her for any acts of negligence
done in performance of her nursing duties. As noted above, if she
does an act determined later to be diagnosis, she has committed a
misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of up to $500.26 Furthermore,
she would probably have her license to practice professional nursing
revoked. 21 However, the duty of care imposed on nurses requires
them to do acts and to make decisions which some courts have held
to be acts of diagnosis.
This duty of care or standard of skill imposed on the nurse by
the law generally requires that the nurse exercise ordinary and rea28
sonable care to see that no unnecessary harm befalls her patient.
More specifically, a nurse must apply that same degree of skill,
learning, and care in treating the sick and wounded similarly suffering in the same or a similar community. 29 The problems with diag26 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97-1-25(1),(2)(1963).
27

d. § 97-1-21.

28Oldis v. La Societe Francaise De Bienfaisance Mutuelle De Los Angeles, 130 Cal.

App. 2d 461, 279 P.2d 184 (1955); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. App. 2d 486,
154 P.2d 687 (1944). This standard of care applies to both licensed professional
nurses and any unlicensed person who acts in a nursing capacity or undertakes to
render nursing services. Griffin v. Colusa County, 44 Cal. App. 2d 915, 113 P.2d 270
(1941) ; Christensen v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 248 Iowa
810, 82 N.W.2d 741 (1957).
29 Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co., 136 Cal. App. 2d 229, 288 P.2d 581 (1955);
Valentin v. La Societe Francaise De Bienfaisance Mutuelle De Los Angeles, 76 Cal.
App. 2d 1, 172 P.2d 359 (1946) ; Wood v. Miller, 158 Ore. 444, 76 P.2d 963

(1938).
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nosis arise under this community-standard-of-care test because a
nurse has a duty to act upon her observations of symptoms and
reactions to the extent of her skill, knowledge, and authority.8"
There are numerous examples of imposition of liability upon
nurses for failure to act upon this observational duty, which has
been termed a "nursing diagnosis," or for failure to observe at all."1
The nurse making such a "nursing diagnosis" must employ reasonable care in judging the seriousness of the symptoms to determine
what action must be taken. 2
Thus, the nurse in Colorado is caught in the middle of conflicting legal responsibilities. In performing her duties of observation of symptoms, she may be guilty of making a medical diagnosis.8 8
Yet, if she fails to do this duty, or does it incorrectly, she is subject
to liability under laws of negligence or malpractice. To allow such
an uncertain situation as this to exist in a day of expanding health
services and care is indefensible and must be corrected.
V. A

CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSE

The dilemma resulting from negligence law, which requires a
nurse to make judgments that border dangerously close to the nebulous concept of diagnosis, opens the provision prohibiting diagnosis
to the constitutional attack of being void for vagueness. In describing this doctrine, the United States Supreme Court has said that a
criminal statute must be "sufficiently explicit to inform those who
are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable
to its penalties .... [Al statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of law."'34 Since the violation of the diagnosis prohibition is a misdemeanor, the Court's language has direct applicability to the nurse's situation in Colorado.
One type of statute that is particularly vulnerable to the charge
of unconstitutional vagueness is a statute that inhibits free speech.
30

Burns v. Bakelite Corp., 17 N.J. Super. 441, 86 A.2d 289 (1952).
Cooper v. National Motor Bearing Co., 136 Cal. App. 2d 229. 288 P.2d 581
(1955) ; Valentin v. La Societe Francaise De Bienfaisance Mutuelle De Los Angeles,
76 Cal. App. 2d 1, 172 P.2d 359 (1946); Palmer v. Clarksdale Hosp., 213 Miss.
601, 57 So. 2d 473 (1952) ; Wismer v. Syracuse Memorial Hosp., 274 App. Div.

31 See

32

1074, 86 N.Y.S.2d 150 (1949).

Burns v. Bakelite Corp., 17 N.J. Super. 441, 86 A.2d 289 (1952). It should be
noted here that the normal nurse's malpractice insurance policy provides coverage
for negligence or malpractice in a nursing diagnosis, but does not cover malpractice in
a medical diagnosis. The latter is termed an illegal practice of medicine which is a
criminal act in most states. M. LESNIK & B. ANDERSON, supra note 21, at 290-91.
33The uncertainty surrounding the definition of "diagnosis" might not apply to the
Colorado situation because of the Attorney General's opinion that nurses cannot make
even a tentative diagnosis. Letter from Duke W. Dunbar, supra note 12.
34
Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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Mr. Justice Brennan has said that "stricter standards of permissible
statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially
inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act
at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the
loser." 3 5 The doctrine that a statute is unconstitutional because of
indefiniteness has been developed to create an "insulating buffer
zone of added protection" for the Bill of Rights freedoms. 6
The dilemma of the Colorado nurse who must chart a course
of action between a vague criminal statute and the responsibilities
imposed by negligence law is even more intolerable than the dilemma
of a person whose free speech is infringed by a vague statutory
prohibition. People do not pay damages for failing to exercise the
right of free speech. People also do not lose their license to practice their chosen profession by acting in accordance with their first
amendment rights. Therefore, to apply the void-for-vagueness doctrine to the nurse's situation would be more than just, and possibly
the strongest defense to an action brought under the diagnosis
prohibition.
VI. A

LEGAL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

While the void-for-vagueness defense would be applicable to
the nurse's situation, it is by no means the best solution to the problem. The diagnostic prohibition for nurses and nondoctors does
have a very legitimate reason for being -it protects the general
public from medical frauds by assuring that only licensed physicians
are allowed to diagnose and prescribe remedies for their physical
and mental ills. Complete elimination of the prohibition could
easily do more harm than good to all groups involved. Therefore,
a more workable solution is called for and fortunately is available.
Since the Colorado courts have not interpreted this section of
the Nurses Practice Act, any case brought under it would allow
them to adopt a definition of diagnosis which would insure adequate protection of the nurses', the doctors', and the public's interests. It is the opinion of the authors that the professional definition
of diagnosis, 37 the one used in actual nursing practice, provides the
best answer to the problem.
By defining diagnosis as the utilization of intelligence to interpret known facts, the "nurse's diagnosis" is specifically included
as permissible conduct. Protection of the public and physicians would
come from the limitation on the nurse's action by the statutory pro35Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
36 Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV.

67 (1967).
text following note 21 supra.

37 See
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hibition against her prescription of therapeutic or corrective measures. 38 The nurse's allowable area of action on her decision from
her "nursing diagnosis" could now be characterized as the prevention of undue injury to the patient or aggravation of the patient's
condition.
Under this interpretation of diagnosis, the test for a nurse's liability for malpractice would be: Should the nurse have taken a course
of action - from those courses available to her - different from
that which she did adopt, based on her observations of the patient's
symptoms and reactions? 3 9 This test has two major advantages over
previous definitions on nursing malpractice. First, it includes the
community-standards test common to malpractice law,40 but allows
for judicial raising of the standard to protect the public from the
possibility of outmoded and harmful nursing practices. Second, it
provides a means of separating the questions of whether the nurse's
actions constituted the illegal practice of medicine or the negligent
practice of nursing, for the test for the former would now be: Was
the course of action adopted by the nurse available to her under the
prescription of therapeutic or corrective measures prohibition? This
is particularly important in light of present nurses' malpractice in4
surance practices. '
One of the main shortcomings of this proposed solution is the
fact it relies upon a suit against a nurse involving the diagnosis
prohibition of the Act. If no suit is instituted, the present uncertain
situation must stand uncorrected. While nurses have not been prosecuted under the present state of the law, there is obviously no guarantee that a situation could arise in the future which would warrant
such a suit. Thus, the final recourse may have to be with the state
legislature and a change of the language of the statute itself.
VII. A NECESSARY STATUTORY CHANGE?
The language of the diagnosis prohibition prevents the nurse
from making any act of diagnosis, and has been interpreted to mean
just that by the Attorney General.4 2 However, it is arguably possible
to reach the proposed solution of the nurse's dilemma under this
prohibition without changing the wording of the statute.
38

COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 97-1-2(1) (1963).
39 This test has been followed but not specifically enunciated in Burns v. Bakelite
Corp., 17 N.J. Super. 441, 86 A.2d 289 (1952), and in Cooper v. National Motor
Bearing Co., 136 Cal. App. 2d 229, 288 P.2d 581 (1955).
40 Although the community-standards doctrine is currently being questioned and in some
cases overruled as applied to physicians and surgeons, the authors feel the test still
has validity when applied to professional nursing. See Brune v. Belinkoff, 235
N.E.2d 793 (Mass. 1968).
41 See note 32 supra.
42 Letter from Duke W. Dunbar, supra note 12.
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Using the proposed definition of diagnosis, 43 it can be argued
that the prohibition actually prevents the nurse from doing anything
at all under her duty to observe symptoms and reactions. This would
eliminate one of the nurse's major functions and place the intolerable burden on the physicians of constantly checking all their patients. Since this is entirely unworkable, the question becomes one
of interpreting the statute to make all of its sections and language
effective and operative. Because it is inconceivable that the legislature intended this result when the statute was enacted, the solution
outlined above would be available to a judge interpreting the statute.
This method of instituting the necessary change is unsure at
best. There is no question that amendment of the statute would be
a far more effective and safe method of controlling the changes to
be made. The simplest way to do this would be to reword the statute
to say, "the practice of professional nursing ...

shall not be deemed

to include the prescription of therapeutic or corrective measures from
any act of diagnosis," and then define diagnosis in the statutes to
mean the utilization of intelligence to interpret known facts. If
necessary, specific courses of action available to the nurse, based
upon the degree of skill, training, and knowledge the particular
type of nurse has acquired, could be enumerated for further protection of the public. Further refinements could be worked out by the
courts as the need for them arises.
CONCLUSION

The City of Denver's nurses are involved in a number of programs which arguably violate the Attorney General's interpretation
of the statute. The value of these programs is great, and the disservice done to the public if they were discontinued by a suit under
the diagnostic prohibition would be greater. We live in a time of
rapidly expanding health and medical services - both public and
private. Many areas do not have enough physicians to handle the
increased workload, so the burden is being shifted down to the next
best trained group -the nurses. The Denver projects discussed in
this Note are good examples of this expansion of nurse's responsibility to free the physicians for more important tasks.
The authors believe that the nurses involved with these projects do an excellent job and are an invaluable service to the people
of the city and state. It would be a public disgrace to halt these projects under the diagnostic prohibition - an outmoded, although well
intentioned law. The projects will continue as before without a
change in the law, but the uncertainty it causes does not contribute
43 See text following note 21 supra.
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to the effectiveness of the programs. We feel that the adoption of
the changes in the law which were suggested in this Note would
remove the uncertainty surrounding these projects and allow for
expanding present programs or similar medical services conducted
by qualified nurses.
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